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Abstract 
This commentary examines whether R2P is a fully-fledged norm. As a normative aspiration R2P is almost universally ac-
cepted. However as a standard of behaviour that states implement as a matter of course R2P is far from fully-fledged. 
By examining state responses to refugee crises in Syria it is argued that powerful states are failing in their special re-
sponsibility to protect. 
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What would it mean to say R2P is a fully-fledged inter-
national norm? There are several aspects to answering 
this question. The first is to understand what we are 
talking about when we use the term “norm”. This word 
is used to describe both an existing social reality and an 
aspiration for a new reality. That can be the cause of 
some confusion. As an aspiration R2P is clear. It articu-
lates a universal standard of appropriate behaviour. 
States should protect their populations and when they 
manifestly fail to do that the international community 
should protect those populations. Because this is clear, 
and because it was unanimously adopted by states in 
2005, we might say the R2P is fully-fledged as a norma-
tive aspiration. As Alex Bellamy (2015, p. 12) notes, 
“the key debates now are ones about how best to im-
plement R2P, not about whether to accept the princi-
ple itself”. The question becomes more complex, how-
ever, when we use “norm” to describe social reality. 
From this perspective we can say that R2P is a norm 
because states are more conscious of their responsibili-
ties to protect populations (their own and others) and 
because they are aware that if they fail to protect their 
own populations other states (or entities like the ICC) 
might intervene in their internal affairs. Bellamy 
(Bellamy 2015, p. 8) offers strong evidence that this 
too is clearly the case. The number of United Nations 
Security Council resolutions reminding states and UN 
peace operations of their responsibility to protect has 
increased. States—if not their populations—are more 
aware of their responsibility to protect. But it seems 
any description of R2P as a norm (especially a fully-
fledged norm) demands more. If we use that term to 
describe social reality rather than normative aspiration 
then we are surely using it to describe the fulfilment of 
the responsibility R2P articulates and states accept.  
This poses a more demanding set of criteria and 
opens up a further set of questions. What does it mean 
to fulfil the responsibility states recognise and do all 
states have the same responsibilities? On the first, it is 
far too simplistic to say the continuing commission of 
atrocities demonstrates the failure of R2P to influence 
reality. This ignores the fact that states for the most 
part do not commit atrocity crimes, a standard that—
we accept—predates 2005. But more significantly, cit-
ing the evidence of ongoing atrocities as evidence of 
R2P’s failure ignores instances where states have acted 
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collectively to protect populations from such crimes. 
Evidence that international intervention has actually 
prevented violence and protected populations is avail-
able (UN News Centre 2015). R2P is not simply a mat-
ter of declaring the intention to protect in an increased 
number of UN Resolutions. Moreover, we cannot ex-
pect R2P to dictate state behaviour because, of course, 
states do have other responsibilities. These include re-
sponsibilities to their own citizens, as well as a respon-
sibility to deliberate with other states as part of a pro-
cess that is necessary to determine how best to 
protect. Now obviously there is a risk here that an em-
phasis on deliberation can be spun in a negative way. 
We are fully aware that the images of unhurried di-
plomacy do not look good against the images of imme-
diate suffering. The “do something” mantra is always 
right. But so is the “do what?” question; and in some 
instances, such as Syria, it is not always obvious about 
what should be done, which means there is a responsi-
bility to deliberate. As Jennifer Welsh (Welsh, 2013) 
writes, R2P involves “the responsibility to consider” 
what can be done to protect. 
Deliberation in this sense is necessary to find ap-
propriate solutions to existing problems, but it can also 
reveal the tragic nature of the problem, which—in its 
strictest sense—involves making a choice from scenar-
ios that are equally bad (Brown, 2007). But tragedy is 
not a permanent feature of human relations (Erskine & 
Lebow, 2012). Deeply embedded in the R2P norm is a 
responsibility to “reduce our vulnerability to trage-
dy”—the phrase is Richard Ned Lebow’s (2012, p. 65)—
and that requires broader conceptualisations of the 
norm. Take the crisis in Syria as an example. Because 
the focus has been on events inside Syria there is a 
tendency to say either that R2P has failed to influence 
events or that protection is not a prudent option. Ob-
viously the Syrian government has “manifestly failed” 
to protect its population. But has the international 
community manifestly failed? At the most demanding 
level, the answer again is yes. It did not come to a con-
sensus in a way that stopped the killing inside Syria. But 
at another level it did accept the responsibility to con-
sider what ought to be done and some access for hu-
manitarian relief operations has been negotiated. But let 
us look at what has been happening outside Syria. From 
this perspective we get a very different view of R2P. It 
leads us to consider what more could have been done 
and it leads us to the second question about whether all 
states have the same responsibility to protect. 
The atrocities inside Syria have caused a refugee 
crisis outside that state. Aside from dead bodies, refu-
gees are perhaps the most obvious manifestation of 
atrocity crimes. People protect themselves by fleeing 
persecution and violence. Because R2P tells us the in-
ternational community has a responsibility to assist 
these people and to protect them it surely implies 
guaranteeing a form of asylum. Again, this predates 
R2P. The 1951 Refugee Convention has long since ar-
ticulated a responsibility to those with a “well-founded 
fear of persecution”. But if the R2P norm is about cre-
ating the political will so that states fulfil their respon-
sibilities as a matter of course, then R2P (both the 
scholarly articulation of it and state practice) is not ful-
ly-fledged. Few authors talk about asylum as a tool of 
R2P. Those that do suggest “[t]here may be no easier 
way for the international community to meet its re-
sponsibility to protect than by providing asylum and 
other international protection on adequate terms” 
(Barbour & Gorlick, 2008, p. 533; see also Davies & 
Glanville, 2010; Orchard, 2014). The relative lack of at-
tention, moreover, distorts our assessment of state re-
sponses to Syria. The responsibility to protect is being 
fulfilled in those states—Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Egypt and Iraq—that have taken in nearly four million 
refugees between them. R2P’s influence is not simply 
confined to chambers and corridors of the UN in New 
York. Victims of atrocity crimes are being protected. As 
far as Syria is concerned, R2P is not entirely failing but 
the world is relying on five states to uphold it. 
This begs the question of what others are doing to 
assist these states. This is particularly pertinent for 
those states which claim to promote R2P and for those 
that have a “special responsibility to protect”. The idea 
of a “special responsibility to protect” is a way of allo-
cating the burden of meeting what would otherwise be 
an unspecified and general responsibility. This is neces-
sary because there is a risk that R2P—as a general (and 
somewhat unspecified) norm—will not be fulfilled if 
states expect others (such as those in the region) to 
bear the burden. A special responsibility is often 
thought of as “significantly more strenuous” (Kagan, 
1988) than a general responsibility and Mlada Buko-
vansky et al. (2012) have recently argued that such re-
sponsibilities can be allocated based on a capacity to 
do good. If we take this to be the case then surely the 
strongest states are failing in their responsibility to pro-
tect. As noted, this is not a question of humanitarian 
military intervention. Military strength is redundant 
when a military solution is not available. Strength here 
is the capacity to protect the vulnerable by providing a 
form of asylum and it is obvious in the case of Syria 
that the strongest are not meeting their responsibility. 
Among European states, for instance, only Germany 
can claim to be meeting its responsibility when consid-
ering the number of resettlement pledges per capita 
alongside GDP per capita. States like the UK, Denmark 
and the Netherlands “all stand out as being countries 
which could afford to shelter more refugees of the Syr-
ian conflict” (Gracio, 2015).  
Bukovansky et al. (2012, p. 220) also argued that 
those bearing a special responsibility “should not be 
entitled to successful appeal to undue costs in those 
situations where they deliberately, recklessly or negli-
gently created the situation of vulnerability”. It is hard 
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to argue that outside states were culpable of creating 
the Syrian population’s situation of vulnerability. This 
stands in contrast to the role of outside states such as 
the UK and Australia in creating the vulnerability of 
Iraq to Islamic State (Ralph & Souter, 2015). Of course, 
there was a greater level of previous external interven-
tion there than there was in Syria. One might argue 
that certain external states bear a special responsibil-
ity by virtue of their omissions—e.g. a failure to over-
throw Assad—but this is weak given the significant 
uncertainty that such actions would have eased the 
population’s vulnerability. Many states, not least the 
Chinese, argued that regime change leads to political 
instability, which in turn leads to more, if not greater, 
vulnerability and harm. Their preference was for a po-
litical solution that included the Assad regime. Those 
making this argument can now, moreover, cite external 
interventions such as Libya in 2011 to make their point. 
External humanitarian intervention may have been 
necessary in 2011—a point the Chinese acknowledged 
with their abstention on Resolution 1973—but regime 
change (either as a goal or as a consequence of the 
intervention) always risked creating a power vacuum, 
which in turn would create a new situation of vulner-
ability. By 2015 this concern seemed to be realised in 
the events in Libya. 
It might be hard to connect European actions to the 
cause of the humanitarian crisis inside Syria, but its link 
to the fate of refugees that have fled the violence is 
less difficult to establish. Indeed commentators have 
noted how European actions have exacerbated the 
vulnerability of refugees in a number of ways. For in-
stance, a new fence between Greece and Turkey 
“stopped migration across the land border, but led to a 
doubling in—more dangerous—crossings of the Aege-
an in the first half of 2014” (Anonymous, 2015). In ad-
dition the EU cut the resources it devoted to search 
and rescue missions under the misplaced assumption 
that such missions were acting as a “pull” factor for 
migrants and the boat trips would stop if the missions 
were withdrawn (Anonymous, 2015; see also Davies & 
Orchard, 2015). It is also possible to argue that the 
NATO-led intervention in Libya, or at least the failure to 
leave a functioning government in place, has contrib-
uted to the situation of vulnerability. Not only has the 
civil war there displaced more than 400,000 Libyans, 
the lack of authority there has hindered a humanitarian 
response to those fleeing other conflicts as they to try 
to cross into Europe. The charge that Europe failed in 
its responsibility to rebuild Libya became something of 
a political football in the 2015 British election, but that 
does not mean there was no substance to it (Paterson, 
2015). Alexander Betts makes a similar point, suggest-
ing that external powers that destabilize countries 
through their foreign policies have a moral responsibil-
ity to do more. This means going beyond providing asy-
lum – which can mean only protecting those who arrive 
on one’s territory—and acting on a responsibility to as-
sist other states by sharing the responsibility for refu-
gee protection through resettlement schemes (Betts, 
2015).  
All this suggests the R2P norm is far from fully-
fledged if by that we take it to mean states fulfil their 
responsibilities as a matter of course. But here we 
agree with Bellamy, R2P has immense potential. States 
accept it as a normative aspiration. If we are to deliver 
on that potential, however, we have to take a critical 
perspective, particularly on the record of those states 
that have a special responsibility to do more because 
they have a unique capacity, and especially when they 
are culpable of creating or exacerbating situations of 
vulnerability. That does not mean, as we have argued, 
strengthening further the powerful state’s commit-
ment to military intervention. Military intervention 
poses many risks to the national interest and to the 
populations the responsible state is trying to protect. 
We witnessed in 2014 and 2015 the consequences of 
military intervention in Libya. It was not necessarily in-
evitable that the 2011 intervention would lead to the 
collapse of that state, but if military intervention inevi-
tably leads to regime change—which the P3 argued 
was the case—then the risk of state collapse was al-
ways going to be high. Again this does not mean that 
R2P should evolve in a way that excludes the kind of 
military intervention that only the powerful states can 
provide. But it does mean that military intervention is 
not the only way strong states can meet their special 
responsibility to protect. These states should, as Jen-
nifer Welsh (2014) has argued, stop looking at R2P as if 
it is something that is done by functioning states out-
side their territory and inside the territory of failing 
states. The responsibility to protect is sometimes best 
dealt with inside functioning states. This requires a 
shift in the discourse on R2P so that it asylum is not 
forgotten as a means of assessing whether the capable 
and culpable are fulfilling their special responsibility to 
protect.  
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